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RICHMOND MEDICAL CENTER FOR WOMEN V. HERRING
In 1973, the Supreme Court held for the first time in Roe v. Wade1 that the
constitutional right of privacy includes a woman's right to choose to terminate
her pregnancy.2 In this landmark decision, the Court prohibited state regulation
of abortion prior to fetal viability.3 At the same time, it sanctioned state
regulation and even proscription of postviability abortion unless the abortion was
necessary for the preservation and protection of maternal health.4 Then, in its
1992 decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
5
the Supreme Court established the undue burden standard, declaring
unconstitutional any law that "place[s] a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability."6 In Casey, the
Court invalidated a provision in a Pennsylvania law that required married
women to notify their husbands prior to receiving an abortion.7
In 2000, the Court first addressed the partial-birth abortion procedure in
Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart 1).8 It held that a Nebraska statute banning partial-
birth abortions must include a health exception "'where [the procedure] is
necessary ... for the preservation of the life or health of the mother."' 9 Finally,
and most recently, in Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart I1),10 the Supreme Court
found constitutional the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 (the Federal
Act),11 which prohibits "[a]ny physician ... [from] knowingly perform[ing] a
partial-birth abortion and... kill[ing] a human fetus. ' 12 The Court reasoned that
unlike the Nebraska statute in Carhart I, the Federal Act was sufficiently clear
because it provided "anatomical landmark[s]" and included an overt act
requirement. The Court also recognized the government's interest in protecting
the integrity of the medical profession by regulating this form of abortion. 
4
These decisions represent some of the most controversial and widely followed
jurisprudence in the country because of their influence upon the lives of women
and families.
15
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Id. at 153.
3. Id. at 163.
4. Id. at 163-64.
5. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
6. Id. at 878 (plurality opinion).
7. Id. at 895.
8. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
9. Id. at 931 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 879).
10. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
11. Id. at 168 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. V 2005)).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).
13. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 149, 153.
14. Id. at 158.
15. See ERWIN CHEMERNSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 820 (3d ed. 2006) ("Few decisions in
Supreme Court history have provoked the intense controversy that has surrounded the abortion
rulings.").
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Last ear in June 2009, in Richmond Medical Center for Women v.
Herring, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit expounded
upon the standards created by these cases when it held that Virginia's Partial
Birth Infanticide Act (the Virginia Act) 17 was not facially unconstitutional.18 In
Richmond Medical Center, a physician brought an action to declare the Virginia
Act unconstitutional and to enjoin enforcement of the Act, claiming that it
"failed to include an exception for the preservation of the mother's health" and
impermissibly "'impose[d] an undue burden on the woman's ability to choose an
abortion."' 19 The physician presented a rare but potential scenario in which he
believed that the Virginia Act would prove unconstitutional. 20 The court
determined that the Virginia Act, which imposes criminal liability on "[a]ny
person who knowingly performs partial birth infanticide and ... kills a human
infant,' '21 is similar in terms to but broader in scope than the Federal Act,22 which
applies to any physician who knowingly delivers a fetus past an anatomical
landmark and performs an overt act that kills the fetus. 23 Nevertheless, it
concluded that the Virginia Act is not overly broad so as to confuse physicians
about permissible conduct and that its terms ensured against a "chilling effect"
on a woman's right to choose an abortion.24 Furthermore, the court reasoned that
the plaintiffs "posited circumstance does not present a sufficiently frequent
circumstance to render the Virginia Act wholly unconstitutional for all
circumstances. 25
In Richmond Medical Center, a medical center and its owner, Dr. William
Fitzhugh, brought an action in federal district court after the Virginia Act was
passed but before it became effective. 26 Specifically, Dr. Fitzhugh argued that
the Virginia Act imposes criminal liability upon a doctor who intends to perform
a standard D & E abortion procedure that accidentally becomes an intact D & E,
a method prohibited by the Virginia Act.27 The Virginia Act does not cover
standard D & E procedures, which are "'the dilation and evacuation abortion
procedure[s] involving dismemberment of the fetus prior to removal from the
body of the mother."' In contrast, the Virginia Act prohibits the intact D & E
procedure, in which the infant is "'completely or substantially expelled or
extracted from [the body of the] mother"' prior to an act that results in its
16. 570 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 2009).
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-71.1 (2009).
18. Id. at 169.
19. Id. at 168.
20. See id. at 170-71.
21. § 18.2-71.1(A).
22. Richmond Med. Ctr., 570 F.3d at 177.
23. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).
24. Richmond Med. Ctr., 570 F.3d at 169.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 168.
27. Id. at 171.
28. Id. at 169-70 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-71.1(B) (2009)).
[VOL. 61 : 649
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death.29 The Virginia Act states that an infant is "substantially expelled or
extracted" when its "entire head is outside the body of the mother" or, in the case
of a breech delivery, when its "trunk past the navel is outside the body of the
mother."30 Dr. Fitzhugh testified that, of the 225 second-trimester abortions he
performs each year, "accidental emergence of the fetus occurs 10% of the time"
and that the fetus emerges to the anatomical landmark described in the Virginia
Act less than 50% of the time. 31 He claimed that the possibility of these rare
situations unconstitutionally exposed all doctors who perform standard D & E
procedures to prosecution under the Virginia Act.32 Dr. Fitzhugh also insisted
that, although the Virginia Act contains an exception to protect the mother's life,
it does not allow a physician to protect against damage to the woman's health.33
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia had
ruled that the Virginia Act was facially unconstitutional and had enjoined its
enforcement. 34 Specifically, it held that the Virginia Act fails to contain a health
exception and places an undue burden on a woman's right to choose an abortion
because it prohibits previability D & E procedures and causes physicians who
perform D & E procedures to fear prosecution. 35 A panel of the Fourth Circuit
36originally affirmed the decision of the district court, and while the case was
pending before the Supreme Court, the Court, in Carhart II, rejected similar
challenges to the Federal Act.37 In light of Carhart II, the Supreme Court38
remanded the case, and both parties filed supplemental briefs adjusting their
arguments. The Fourth Circuit again affirmed the holding for the plaintiffs,39 and
the government defendants moved for a rehearing en banc, which resulted in the
court's current holding of constitutionality.
4 °
Written by Judge Niemeyer and joined by Chief Judge Williams and Judges
Wilkinson, Shedd, Duncan, and Agee, the majority opinion declared the Virginia
Act constitutional for three main reasons:
(1) Dr. Fitzhugh's posited circumstance does not present a sufficiently
frequent circumstance to render the Virginia Act wholly
unconstitutional for all circumstances; (2) the Virginia Act's scienter
29. Id. (quoting § 18.2-71.1(A)-(C)).
30. § 18.2-71.1(D).
31. Richmond Med. Ctr., 570 F.3d at 170.
32. Id. at 171.
33. Id. at 170.
34. Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Hicks, 301 F. Supp. 2d 499, 517-18 (E.D. Va. 2004),
rev'd sub nom. Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Herring, 570 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 2009).
35. Id. at 513-15.
36. Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Hicks, 409 F.3d 619, 629 (4th Cir. 2005), vacated sub
nom. Herring v. Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women, 550 U.S. 901 (2007).
37. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007).
38. Herring v. Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women, 550 U.S. 901 (2007).
39. Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Herring, 527 F.3d 128, 131 (4th Cir. 2008), rev 'den
banc, 570 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 2009).
40. Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Herring, 570 F.3d 165, 168-69 (4th Cir. 2009).
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language ... provides sufficient notice to a reasonable doctor of what
conduct is prohibited by the statute; and (3) the provisions for a safe
harbor and affirmative defenses, as well as the requirement of "an overt
act," ensure that the Virginia Act will not create a barrier to ... a
woman's right to have a standard D & E or her physician's ability to
undertake that procedure without fear of criminal liability. 41
The court first discussed the policy preference for avoiding facial challenges to
statutes, emphasizing that, in the context of abortion, courts should hear these
challenges only where the statute "'will operate as a substantial obstacle to a
woman's choice to undergo an abortion' 'in a large fraction of the cases in which
[the statute] is relevant."'' 42 Dr. Fitzhugh's claim failed to satisfy this standard
because he could not demonstrate that the Virginia Act criminalizes the standard
D & E procedures that accidentally become intact D & Es "'in a large fraction of
the cases"' in which the Virginia Act applies. 43 Where an act operates
constitutionally in some circumstances, it cannot be found facially
unconstitutional.44
Second, the court explained that, despite the differences between the
Virginia Act and the Federal Act, the former is sufficiently clear about the
conduct it prohibits.45 The scienter requirement in the Virginia Act does not
attach to the delivery of the fetus but rather to the "'deliberate act' that kills 'a
human infant who has been born alive.' ' 46 Therefore, the physician's intent
before beginning the D & E procedure is "not determinative of scienter for
purposes of criminal liability."4 In contrast, the Federal Act absolves physicians
of criminal liability regardless of the outcome if they intend to perform a
48standard D & E procedure from the beginning of the procedure. Still, the court
held that the intent requirement of the Virginia Act "require[s] purpose, not mere
knowledge, that a specific act-taken after emergence [of the fetal body] to the
anatomical landmark-will result in fetal demise. 49
Third, the court emphasized that the Virginia Act exempts a physician from
liability when the mother's life is in danger, which almost always occurs in the
event of a partial expulsion of a fetus. 50 When the mother's life is not in danger,
the Virginia Act prohibits the doctor from completing the abortion by
41. Id. at 169.
42. Id. at 171 (alteration in original) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 895 (1992)).
43. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 895).
44. Id. at 173.
45. Id. at 175-76.
46. Id. at 176 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-71.1(B) (2009)).
47. Id.
48. Id. (citing Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 151 (2007)).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 177-78.
[VOL. 61 : 649
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deliberately acting to kill the fetus.5 1 In this rare situation, the State maintains its
"recognized interest in the life of the fetus," and this interest "must be
counterbalanced against the mother's right to an abortion.' '52 Moreover, Judge
Niemeyer wrote that "[t]he Virginia Act ... makes a clear distinction between
the acts necessary to deliver the fetus and the prohibited overt acts that destroy
the fetus. 53 As a result, the court maintained that the Virginia Act neither
creates a barrier to a woman's choice to have a standard D & E procedure nor
impedes a doctor's ability to perform the procedure.54
In his separate concurring opinion, Judge Wilkinson asserted that a proper
reconsideration of the Virginia Act requires a finding of constitutionality because
of its similarity to the Federal Act upheld in Carhart IT.55 He wrote that "[t]he
state's interest in protecting life" does not disappear simply because "the intact
delivery of the [fetus] is unintentional. 56 Thus, "[t]he state may prohibit a
deliberate and unconscionable act against the intact, partially born child,
regardless of how the child got there." Judge Wilkinson surmised that neither
the framers of the Constitution nor the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment
intended to protect a "controversial method of abortion so unconnected to those
struggles that led to the formation of this nation." 58 Also, in predicting future
citizens' reaction to the decision, Judge Wilkinson opined that the next
generation will reflect upon the practice of partial-birth abortion and "shudder.,
59
Judge Michael wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Judges Motz, Traxler,
King, and Gregory joined. Judge Michael argued that the Virginia Act is
unconstitutional for its imposition of criminal liability upon any doctor who
begins a standard D & E that accidentally becomes an intact D & E.60 He
interpreted the Carhart II decision to rest upon the Federal Act's requirement of
intent of the physician at the outset of the procedure; without this requirement,
the Virginia Act provides no protection.61 He further found a lack of protection
in the majority's acclaimed affirmative defenses, which he criticized as "hollow"
and without "any realistic or reliable option" for physicians who find themselves
in the situation of an accidental intact D & E.62 Focusing on the technicalities of
the accidental intact D & E, Judge Michael insisted that "[o]nce a fetus emerges
to [the] anatomical landmark" specified in the Virginia Act, the physician must
51. Id. at 178.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 179.
55. Id. at 180 (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (citing Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007)).
56. Id. at 181.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 183.
60. Id. at 184 (Michael, J., dissenting).
61. Id. (discussing Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 148 (2007)).
62. Id.
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still take steps to complete the full expulsion of the fetus from the mother.
63
These steps usually require either disarticulation of the fetal body or
compression of the skull, both of which lead to fetal death.64 Therefore,
according to Judge Michael, the Virginia Act fails to distinguish between acts
65that complete the delivery and acts that cause fetal demise. As a result,
physicians expose themselves to criminal liability every time they set out to
perform a standard D & E.66 According to Judge Michael, this exposure will
discourage doctors from performing the safest and most commonly used method
of previability second-trimester abortion-a standard D & E-thereby creating
an undue burden upon women's access to the procedure.
67
The dissent also pointed out that the majority's analysis of the Virginia Act's
life exception would actually allow doctors to avoid criminal liability any time
doctors perform an intact D & E.68 During an intact D & E, the fetus's "trunk
[becomes] extracted 'past the anatomical landmark"' and the head becomes
"lodged in the cervix," risking the mother's life and requiring the doctor to
compress the fetal skull to save the mother's life.69 As a result, the majority's
interpretation of the life exception would permit the very conduct that the
Virginia Act is supposed to criminalize, regardless of whether the conduct was
intentional or unintentional. 70 The dissent concluded that "[t]his simply cannot
be the purpose of the life exception.,
71
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Richmond Medical Center for Women v.
Herring supports the congressional intent behind the partial-birth abortion ban in
the Federal Act. Congressional findings state that "[a] moral, medical, and
ethical consensus exists that the practice of performing a partial-birth abortion
... is a gruesome and inhumane procedure that is never medically necessary and
should be prohibited., 72 Moreover, the Court in Carhart II explained that the
purposes of the Federal Act are to avoid "'further coarsen[ing] society to the
humanity of not only newborns, but all vulnerable and innocent human life"' and
to protect the medical community's ethics and reputation.73 Still, the policy
underlying the protection of fetal life garners more weight in this decision than
in Carhart II due to the statutory composition of the Virginia Act. While the
Federal Act specifically requires that the person performing the abortion intend
from the outset to deliver the fetus to an anatomical landmark for the purposes of
63. Id. at 186.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 191.
66. Id. at 190.
67. Id. at 184.
68. Id. at 193.
69. Id. (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 151 (2007)).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 194.
72. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2, 117 Stat. 1201, 1201
(codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006)).
73. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 156-57 (quoting § 2(14)(N), 117 Stat. at 1206).
[VOL. 6 1: 649
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performing a fatal overt act, the Virginia Act remains silent on any such initial
intent.74 The Fourth Circuit in Richmond Medical Center acknowledges this
crucial difference in wording, but it argues that it matters only in the rare
situation in which a partial expulsion of the fetus has accidentally occurred and
the mother's life is not in danger.75 In such a circumstance, the court deems
criminal liability acceptable for the very policy that supports partial-birth
abortion bans-the protection of human life. 6 Therefore, through the omission
of the intent requirement in the statute and the holding in Richmond Medical
Center, the drafters of the Virginia Act and a majority of the judges of the Fourth
Circuit have advanced a policy choice that protects fetal life and condemns
partial-birth abortions.
The Virginia Act does not violate the Casey standard by imposing an undue
burden upon women's access to abortion. Physicians use standard D & E
procedures for over 75% of first- and second-trimester pregnancies, eliminating
the majority of women who seek abortions from the scope of this decision.
Moreover, as the evidentiary record in this case shows, the likelihood is small
that a standard D & E will accidentally become a prohibited intact D & E.78 still,
when it does, the mother's life is "almost always" in danger, in which case the
physician escapes criminal liability for taking steps necessary to deliver the79
fetus. The dissent falls short in its examination of the life exception's purpose
and fails to explain why or how the exception would not cover nearly all
situations in which an accidental intact D & E occurs. Furthermore, the undue
burden standard evolved from the invalidation of a spousal notification
requirement.8s Unlike this affirmative step that women were required to take
before obtaining an abortion, the issue in Richmond Medical Center was the
potential discouragement of physicians from undertaking a certain type of
abortion procedure. The possibility of a chilling effect upon physician conduct
simply does not constitute a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
to exercise her right to an abortion.
Through its decision on the facial challenge in Richmond Medical Center,
the Fourth Circuit recognized Virginia's interest in protecting fetal life.
However, the Fourth Circuit left open whether subsequent as-applied challenges
74. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1531(b)(1)(A) (2006) ("[T]he term 'partial-birth abortion' means
an abortion in which the person performing the abortion... deliberately and intentionally vaginally
delivers a living fetus... for the purpose of performing an overt act that the person knows will kill
the partially delivered living fetus .... " (emphasis added)), with VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-71.1(B)
(2009) (.' [P]artial birth infanticide' means any deliberate act that ... is intended to kill a human
infant who has been born alive, but who has not been completely extracted or expelled from its
mother....").
75. Richmond Med. Ctr., 570 F.3d at 179.
76. Id. at 178.
77. Id. at 174-75.
78. See id. at 178.
79. Id.
80. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992).
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will be successful. Due to the narrowness of the decision and the infrequent
situations in which such an interpretation of the Virginia Act proves necessary,
the holding most likely will not create drastic changes in the use or practice of
abortion. Physicians who perform second-trimester abortions may find it
necessary to educate their patients about the possibility of an accidental intact D
& E and explain their need to avoid criminal liability by completing a full
delivery of the live fetus in the event that such an incident occurs. This
additional conversation is unlikely to alter a woman's ultimate decision to
terminate her pregnancy. In the end, the decision of the court in Richmond
Medical Center and this additional conversation that may result from it are
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